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Publications on the 16 yeast chromosome sequences group together over 400 different 
authors from Europe, Japan, Australia and the USA. When research is not organised in 
networks, it is carried out in large sequencing centres such as the Sanger Centre in Britain, 
the Helix Institute in Japan or Saint Louis University in the USA. Both cases illustrate the 
collective nature of knowledge creation. Other examples of co-operation between 
numerous researchers in various countries, more closely related to innovation, might also 
be mentioned, such as the development of software for comparing proteins or DNA 
sequences. 
Collective publications reveal the collective nature of research, whether it is carried out by 
major consortia (the case of yeast) or around large research facilities (such as the 
synchrotron or major genome sequencing centres). This collective nature stems from two 
factors: (1) the advantages of co-ordinating efforts on major projects (e.g. economies of 
scale and of collection) and (2) very strong interdependency in the creation and utilisation 
of knowledge (related to cumulativeness). 
The detailed analysis of scientific practices in genome research (yeast) during the years 
1987 to 96 provides suitable material for identifying the characteristics of scientific 
production in emerging fields, i.e.: (1) the collective nature of scientific production, 
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revealed by the number of authors of publications; (2) the co-ordination of researchers 
around a handful of major facilities (sequencing centres); (3) partial or delayed publication 
in journals or proceedings; (4) numerous controversies on obligations to divulge 
information2 or on the referee system3. From lawsuits to controversies, and from 
controversies to anecdotes, genome research offers the image of a world in which tension 
between the creation and the utilisation of knowledge is strong. 
The first section of this text analyses the principles underlying the organizational system in 
Europe. It describes the conditions under which this type of approach is effective. It insists 
especially on the financial conditions which are up to 4 USD per base. Some elements of 
impact of this organization on the relative position of science in Europe are presented. 
Although the European experience of yeast sequencing is an interesting one, it cannot be 
imitated exactly. Hence, the second section examines the extent to which certain modes of 
organization warrant being adapted and transposed to the sequencing of other organisms. 
1. EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION OF YEAST SEQUENCING 
The entire scientific community celebrates the complete sequencing of the Saccharomyces 
cerevisiae genome and the making available of genetic information and material. Indeed, 
yeast is an important organism for biologists because it is used as a model (Vassarotti, A., 
Dujon, B. et al., 1995). The E.U. financed 56% of the sequencing, which was carried out 
by almost a hundred laboratories specialised in biology and therefore having limited 
sequencing capacities.  
The European system is in fact radically different from that in America, Canada or Japan, 
where sequencing capacities have been concentrated in a small number of laboratories. The 
mode of organization chosen by the E.U. offers original answers to recurrent questions on 
the conditions of appropriating results, the setting up of financial and scientific incentives, 
the division of work and the public or private nature of the knowledge and artefacts 
produced. A detailed study of the division of work between European laboratories has 
revealed the main principles underpinning the co-ordination of activities. It shows how the 
                                                 
2 Scientific journals compelled researchers to submit oligonucleotide sequences to one of the public banks 
before publication. This practice was jointly decided by about fifty journals at the beginning of the 90s. 
Nature joined them in January 1996. 
3 The establishment of its rules of good conduct followed the fraudulent use by one of the reviewers of the 
prestigious journal Nature, of data in an article that had, moreover, been refused publication (Science, 270, 







































various incentive mechanisms and legal and contractual aspects combine to ensure that all 
the actors profit from the research effort.  
European organizational system 
In 1988 the various teams involved agreed on a global, multi-national strategy, i.e. 
repartition of sequencing by chromosome; step-by-step sequencing; separation of 
functionalization and sequencing; establishment of quality standards; and work on an 
identical strain provided by M. Olson and L. Riles (Saint Louis, USA). The standardisation 
of results enabled the teams involved in the sequencing to organise themselves as they 
wished, and to use diverse techniques. 
The organizational system adopted in the EEC, based on these guidelines, was coupled 
with a number of rules which have promoted co-operation between over a hundred 
laboratories (Dujon, B.e.a., 1994; Feldmann, H.e.a., 1994; Oliver, S.e.a., 1992). As the 
diagram below shows, the co-ordination of work by chromosome is entrusted to a 
researcher who is responsible for sequencing on the entire chromosome and allocates tasks 
to the various co-contractants. He/she works in collaboration with the informatics co-
ordinator who helps him/her in allocating the cosmids at the start and assembling the 
sequences at the end. 





























Diagram 1 shows how the different elements in the organizational system interact: 
financial incentives, scientific incentives, guarantee of confidentiality and dissemination of 
genetic material and information. 
                                                 








































Principle 1 : Standardisation of results 
The standardisation of results is a core element in the coordination of the division of work 
in Europe. It facilitates the establishment of financial incentives based on quantifiable 
results. The terms of reference define very precisely the respective role of each of the 
chromosome co-ordinators, information co-ordinators or laboratory sequencers. They 
define mainly the type and status of the objects exchanged, e.g. quality standards (ratio of 
errors in the sequencing of cosmids); minimum sizes of cosmids - which increase 
progressively to facilitate the management of sequencing (from a set of 8 Kb in 1989 to 2 
or 3 sets 35 Kb in 1995); and formats for computer data. On the other hand, the 
laboratories are entirely free to choose their sequencing methods. 
Principle 2 : Payment by the piece and rate differentiated in relation to quantities 
Financial incentives exist on several levels: sequencing laboratories, chromosome co-
ordinators and informatics co-ordinator. In each case the principles are similar: payment by 
the piece and tapering rates in relation to learning. Payment by the piece is one of the ways 
in which laboratories are forced to honour their commitments. It is possible only when 
expected results are defined precisely and are measurable. In our study set rates varied 
according to technical progress and to experience gained. Hence, in the first biotech (BAP) 
contract in 1989, the price paid to the sequencing laboratories was 5 ECU per pair of bases, 
while in 1996 it is 1,6 ECU. 
Rates are differentiated in relation to the quantities sequenced. The price per pair of bases 
paid by the EEC to a laboratory is lower if the laboratory exceeds a certain volume of 
contiguous sequenced cosmids (e.g. 100 Kb in Biotech II). This reduction of the unitary 
rate constitutes a ceiling on the laboratories' profits. Thus, costs were calculated to limit 
situation rents without discouraging potential entries in sequencing (rate differentiated in 
terms of quantities sequenced). Whether an outcome of financial incentives or the 
discovery of the necessity of acquiring know-how in sequencing, the number of 
laboratories involved in the sequencing of yeast has risen from 35 (chromosome III) to 
over a ninety (total number of chromosomes sequenced by the EEC). Some of these joined 
the Biotech II programme with very small quantities to sequence (25 Kb) [cf. biotech 
contract]. Tapering rates thus make it possible to avoid the establishment of barriers to 







































Principle 3 : limited priority rights and incentives to publish 
In collaboration with the MIPS, the co-ordinator is responsible for publishing the 
chromosome sequence when it is complete and when quality control, assembly and 
verification have been carried out. Such publication in prestigious journals is co-signed by 
all the participants, with the chromosome co-ordinator being featured as the main author 
and the MIPS manager as the last author. 
Publishing by chromosome is not systematic. The Americans and UK, for example, made 
public information by groups of cosmid (100-200 kb), which has enabled them to 
disseminate information faster. The European procedure explains delays of up to two years 
in publishing information. However, according to the stakeholders, these delays enable 
them to guarantee the quality of the information (absence of sequencing errors) [Goffeau, 
personal interview, 6/96]. Submitting the sequences to the MIPS and publishing data are 
clearly two separate procedures. Laboratories are strongly encouraged in the following 
ways to submit their sequences to the MIPS: the "first come first served" rule is an 
incentive to research teams to submit their sequences rapidly in order to receive others; in 
the case of overlapping parts priority is given to the first team that submits its results; a 
part of the payment (50%) is subject to conformity with quality requirements. By contrast, 
incentives to publish sequences are merely ethical since the sequences submitted to the 
MIPS are covered by a confidentiality clause until publication of the chromosome. 
Between submittal to the MIPS database and publication of the entire chromosome, the 
laboratory can exercise a priority right in so far as it has complete latitude for carrying out 
complementary biological research and even publishing its results or patenting them. The 
allocation of a segment to a laboratory is therefore attended by temporary "ownership" (or 
a right of reservation) which theoretically ought to act as an incentive to link sequencing 
activities to complementary activities oriented towards application: 
"Each segment assigned to and accepted by a participant becomes his/her property for the duration 
of the sequencing of the entire chromosome and cannot be claimed by others" (Vassarotti et al., 
1995: 133). 
Yet, any sequencing laboratory can ask the Mips to compare a sequence to the sequences 
of the base yeast even if the latter are confidential. If homologies with unpublished 
sequences are identified, the two laboratories are put into contact. 
"A database of the confidential, unpublished but submitted sequences is indirectly accessible by the 
user community: requests to search for homologies in the confidential database are processed 







































sequence and the scientist who issued the request are informed of the existence of similar sequence" 
(Vassarotti et al., 1995: 134). 
The contractual system is new and interesting. The main concern here is to give participant 
laboratories the opportunity of exercising a dual function: that of sequencing, which is 
codified precisely, and that of complementary biological research which appears in the 
form of a priority right. This novelty no doubt stems from the nature of the laboratories 
which participate in the operation; they are yeast biology laboratories and not merely 
"mercenary" sequencers. The possibility is thus created, before publication of the 
chromosome, of appropriating the sequence, either by scientific publication or by 
patenting. This system can also be seen as an experimental process in which different 
procedures can be tested. No attempt is made to decide in advance on the public or private 
nature of the sequences. 
Conditions required by this type of approach 
The effectiveness of the organization of yeast genome sequencing depends on the 
combination of three key elements: 
- The yeast genome was small enough (12 megabases) for work to be allocated to 
laboratories with small "craft" sequencing capacities. The choice of the yeast genome 
cannot be dissociated from technical conditions in 1988-89. Sequencing techniques were in 
their infancy at that stage and sequencing itself constituted a bottleneck in many 
laboratories. Specialised databases and the exploitation of such information were barely 
advanced. Only homological comparison techniques (oligonucleotide and protein) were 
widely available. Sequencing was carried out by laboratories specialised in biology and not 
by large research centres since these did not yet exist at the time. 
- Preliminary reports (Danchin, A., 1987) and articles seldom refer to debate on the choice 
of a complete sequencing for yeast**. Similarly, it seems that the decision to separate 
sequencing and functionalization was not debated; everything happens as if this option was 
tacitly ratified. 
- Support from public authorities - European and national - was above all financial. The 
European communities funded the sequencing of the following chromosomes either fully 
                                                 
** Except perhaps the article by J. Ninio
 (Ninio, J., 1992) which compares the work of exploiting sequences 
to the exploitation of data in a telephone directory. However, Ninio quotes no author other than himself to 







































or partially: II, III, IV, VII, X, XI, XII, XIV, XV, XVI. European laboratories also received 
national funds (Cf. Acknowledgement (Dujon B.e.a., 1994; Oliver S.e.a., 1992)). 
This additional funding is not taken into account when the cost of sequencing the yeast 
genome is estimated. Although the variety of modalities of additional funding make it 
difficult to obtain reliable figures, it appears that such funds are equivalent to between 50% 
and 100% of EEC funds. 
Table 1 : Cost of sequencing 




















2 Feldmann  807  80,7  30  1  614    920,6   
3 Oliver  314  47,6 156  1  570    874,3   
4 L2  Jacq  600  30,0  15  1 200    684,4   
7  Tettelin  1 150  114,0  15  2 300    1 311,8   
10 Galibert  720  72,0  15  1  440    821,3   
11 Dujon  666  66,6    1  332    759,7   
12 L  Hoheisel  450  22,5  15  900    513,3   
14 Philippsen  810  81,0  15  1  620    924,0   
15  Dujon  1 150  114,0  15  2 300    1 311,8   
16 
L2 
Goffeau 300  15,0  15  600   342,2   
 fixed  costs     21         
  Total E.U.  6967  643,4  312  14 876  2 050,9  8 463,5  26 345,8 
  USA  2  500           
  UK  2  190           
  Canada 535           
  Japan  270           
  TOTAL  12  462           
estimation of costs: 
-sub-contractor : 2 Ecus/base except BAP with 5 Ecus 
-verification and overlaps : 658 Kb overlaps intra EEC and 671 Kb diverse verifications at 1 ECU 
- estimation of additional funds by national authorities: 50% of costs financed by EEC on the basis of 2 Ecus 
per pair of bases (rough estimation considering the different types of funding - e.g. purchase of material, but 
not researchers salaries). 
 
The total sequencing costs are around 26 245 Kecus for 6967 Kb, i.e. 3,781 Ecus per base 
(4,79 USD). To the sequencing costs must be added functionalization costs (EEC Eurofan 
contract for 7320 Kecus). In total, the sequencing and functionalization budget of yeast 
genes is around 35 million Ecus for the 6967 Kb, which places the cost of the 3800 genes 
sequenced by the E.U. at between 10,0 and 12,6 Kecus (and between 24,1 and 30,6 Kecus 
for 1400 new genes). These figures are higher than estimates made by A. Goffeau and A. 
Vassarotti (Goffeau, A. and Vassarotti, A., 1993) (20 million ECU) who take into account 







































Impact of European sequencing programmes 
Apart from the complete sequencing of the yeast genome - an undeniable scientific 
achievement - the distribution of work among the numerous European laboratories has 
been instrumental in structuring of the yeast research community in Europe. The 
exploitation of information from bibliometric databases provides some indication of these 
effects (Cf. Box 1). 
Closer attention focused on Europe 
Diagram 2 demonstrates the upsurge of Europe after 1990, when the E.C. firmly supported 
the sequencing of the yeast genome. 
Diagram 2 : Respective evolution of "yeast genome" scientific production in various parts of 















Source : DBA database 
The results are highlighted by the fact that Europe is the only area in which scientific 
production has soared, while growth in Japan is slow and uniform and the US and Canada 







































Yeast, a model organism 
The use of studies on yeast as a model for sequencing the human genome is often put 
forward by researchers to justify their interest in this micro-organism. In order to identify 
how and by whom yeast is used as a model, we used the BCI database to compile six files 
on the 1000 most productive and most cited authors on the genome (in general) and then 
on the yeast and plant genomes. Our analyses revealed: 
- limited relations between the different genomes (4,4% of the authors were in all three 
files); 
- 148 authors common to the yeast and general files (160 for the plant file). Out of these 
148 authors, over 50% are productive on the human genome. 
Thus, it seems that yeast is indeed used as a model, particularly by researchers who work 
on the human genome, for testing new methods or tools on a micro-organism before 
"trying" it on humans. 
2. CONDITIONS FOR EXPORTING THIS MODEL OF COOPERATION 
Specific conditions related to the organism 
The detailed organization of yeast sequencing under the aegis of the EEC cannot be 
dissociated from a given scientific and technological context: reduced size of the genome; 
fledgling sequencing techniques; sequencing carried out by yeast research laboratories; 
important budgets and widespread scientific agreement on the programme to be conducted. 
When a programme is successful there is a strong temptation to apply the same methods to 
similar problems. In particular, we recall the sequencing of Arabidopsis thaliana. Yet, 
between Saccharomyces cerevisiae and Arabidopsis thaliana, conditions are radically 
different; the Arabidopsis thaliana genome is ten times bigger that that of yeast and 
sequencing has become a routine, industrial activity. Hence, "craft" sequencing is no 
longer an economically viable organizational modality, although resorting to a limited 
number of laboratories which already have significant sequencing capacities is politically 
tricky since it favours certain countries which already enjoy a privileged position. 
During the sequencing of the yeast genome, potential actors were easily identified and 
most of them were already involved in sequencing. For Arabidopsis thaliana, on the other 







































necessary separation between sequencing and the use of sequencing. Indeed, very few 
plant laboratories were able to sequence effectively. It seems, moreover, that the 
Arabidopsis thaliana genome presented more intrinsic difficulties than did the yeast 
genome.  
Exact duplication is therefore problematical. Yet, the principles of payment by the piece 
and standardisation of results can easily be retained. By contrast, given the distinction 
between sequencing laboratories and user laboratories, and the absence of unanimous 
scientific agreement on tasks to be undertaken, Principle 3 - the most innovative - will 
have to undergo substantial amendments before it can be applied elsewhere. 
Evolutions of organization are required 
Complete sequencing of the Saccharomyces cerevisiae genome generated numerous 
controversies between French and American teams; the latter criticised the former for not 
immediately making the results of sequencing available to the scientific community at 
large. The Europeans replied that the production of clean and ordered sequences had a high 
added value that they alone provided, and that this type of procedure needed time. Even 
within European teams, the MTA (Material Transfer Agreements) accompanying the 
exchange of genetic material generated widespread controversy when these documents 
specified conditions for use that were too restrictive, or unacceptable citation requirements 
(the need systematically to feature in second position on the list of authors of all articles in 
which the material was used). These two points illustrate appropriation problems which 
must be taken into account for sustainable co-operation. 
In emergent scientific fields such as genome research we find the circulation not only of 
articles and patents, but also of competencies embodied in persons, in experimental devices 
and in genetic material. The status of everything circulating between the different 
laboratories and researchers, whether embodied in humans or in artefacts, is uncertain. It 
may concern research-related material, unpublished preliminary results, or simply genetic 
material (e.g. purified proteins). 
Studies on genetics and molecular biology carried out by sociologists of science have 
clearly shown the role of access to data in scientific practice (Hilgartner, S., 1994; 
Hilgartner, S., 1995; Hilgartner, S. and Brandt-Rauf, S., 1994). Researchers develop real 
strategies to appropriate data, know-how, research material and intermediate results which 







































valorise. Drawing upon an analysis of the discovery of sex hormones at the beginning of 
the century, N.Oudshoorn (Oudshoorn, N., 1990) shows how the access to research 
material is a critical resource. Whoever has access to sufficient quantities of research 
material is a generator of scientific progress. Thus, access to data may constitute a source 
of « contributions in kind » when co-operation is being agreed: 
"I've got these clones, you've got expertise with this technique, let's pool our resources and do 
the following project", (Hilgartner, S. and BrandtRauf, S.I., 1994).  
Yet, the uncertainties regarding their nature makes it difficult to take them into account in 
economic and legal terms. Depending on the moment or the place in which they are 
studied, they are either the results of research or inputs into research. Furthermore, the type 
or degree of originality of research material is completely dependent on the state of the 
science and of the networks to which the laboratories belong. For some of them access to 
mutants is problematical since they do not produce any themselves and they maintain only 
loosely coupled4 relationships with those laboratories which do. For others, the access to 
mutants is not a problem since they are well integrated in the production networks. Access 
to contig cards could be, however, problematical. Thus, the more or less critical nature of 
resources to which the laboratory would like to have access depends on its position in the 
networks of other laboratories with which it works. 
The strategies formed around data are increasingly diverse when these data are 
heterogeneous (intermediate results, research material, software, data bases, etc.). 
Hilgartner et Brandt-Rauf (1994) identify three generic strategies for reducing access to 
data: 
1. Non release of data: This strategy consists of keeping data private before the publication 
of the research. A typical case is that of a group which constructs a contig card from a 
public library. In this case the release of the contig card would be directly exploitable and 
could provide rival laboratories in the « gene hunt » with an advantage. 
2. Delayed access: Proposing delayed access to data enables the producers of this data to 
maintain a big enough gap compared to rival groups. Once the laboratory has exploited the 
intermediary results there is no reason not to make them available to the entire scientific 
community; on the contrary, for if another group uses the data it will have to cite the 
laboratory and researchers that first produced it. 
                                                 







































3. Data isolation: This concerns the provision of access to partial data which cannot be 
used directly by another laboratory. By withholding a part of the information the rest 
cannot be used to reproduce the experiment or innovation. The advantage for the 
laboratory lies in making its presence known and in showing its lead so as to discourage 
potential competitors. 
Yeast sequencing in Europe was mainly based on delayed publication even if the status of 
data was not clearly defined. De facto this contractual system created a continuum between 
the public and private status of data5 (team data, pooled data, quasi-public data, public 
data).The play on these different levels of status allowed for compromise between 
incentives to research, the co-ordination of teams, and the development of partnership. For 
a year a sequence was reserved for a laboratory for its biological research (team data); it 
could be tested «  blindly  » by other laboratories in the consortium (pooled data); and, 
lastly, information on the sequence was released to the Yeast Industrial Platform (quasi-
public data). 
CONCLUSION 
Such an organization underlines several problems and shows what kinds of modifications 
are required : 
- the main problem is the cumulativeness of science. When publication of sequences is 
delayed, circulation of knowledge and research materials is also delayed as well as 
scientific progress. Whereas the problem is simple, the solution is not. It is necessary to 
find a system which allows private appropriation of scientific production and which 
encourages knowledge and data (research materials, partial and incomplete results, etc.) 
circulation. Delayed publication does not seem to be the right system for that. 
- Faced with the scientific and institutional originality of the problems with which they are 
confronted, the actors invent new modes of appropriation founded on amended publication 
rules or on the creation of new contracts (the MTA). These new modes of appropriation 
emerge spontaneously to solve isolated problems of co-ordination, and are progressively 
generalised when adopted by other groups and researchers.  
                                                 
5 We find here the same categories as those identified by Cassier in his analysis of the joint research 







































- To be sustainable, co-operation in emerging scientific fields such as genomics needs a 
creation of new modes of organization of research which proposes a better balance between 




Box : The Databases 
Longitudinal analyses have been carried out, drawing upon articles available in the Derwent 
Biotechnology Abstract (DBA) database available on CD-Rom since 1982. This is a practical base 
since it has been available on CD-Rom from the outset. On the other hand, its coverage is not as 
extensive as that of the Biotechnology Citation Index (BCI) which has been available on CD-Rom 
only since 1991. Analyses of citations and partnerships have been made on data in this base. 50903 
references were extracted from the BCI, enabling the identification of 106190 different authors. The 
plant file contains 6033 references while the yeast file has 3342. 
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